商户侧 /api/client/v1、源头侧 /api/open/v1 与乐玩开放平台各有一套签名实现, 其中语义完全一致的部分重复了多份,任一处修复都容易漏改另外两处。 - 新增 internal/pkg/signutil,只收敛四类一致性原语:HMAC-SHA256→hex、 body SHA256 摘要、时间戳偏差校验、常数时间比较 - 中间件与 lewan 改为调用该包,删除 middleware 里重复的 hmacSHA256Hex 与 abs64 - 刻意不统一「签名串构造」:三者拼接方式是对外契约且互不相同 (商户:字典序 & + body 摘要;源头:字典序 & + body 原文;乐玩:换行 6 行), 强行合并会直接改变握手结果 - 保留各处原有细节语义:商户侧十六进制签名大小写不敏感、乐玩签名原样比较、 VerifyWebhook 在 allowedSkew<=0 时仍要求时间戳可解析 验证:三套方案既有端到端测试全部通过(含乐玩官方测试向量、大写签名、重放拒绝); 新增 signutil 已知向量与偏差/比较边界测试,以及 VerifyWebhook 边界语义测试。
108 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
108 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
package lewan
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import (
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"strconv"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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// 这些用例锁定 VerifyWebhook 在「共享原语重构」时被刻意保留的边界语义。
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func TestVerifyWebhookTimestampContract(t *testing.T) {
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const (
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secret = "whsec_test"
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eventID = "evt_1"
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)
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rawBody := []byte(`{"hello":"world"}`)
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now := time.Now().Unix()
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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timestamp string
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allowedSkew time.Duration
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want bool
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}{
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{
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name: "allowedSkew 为 0 时仍要求时间戳可解析",
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timestamp: "not-a-number",
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allowedSkew: 0,
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want: false,
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},
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{
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name: "allowedSkew 为 0 时同一秒通过",
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timestamp: strconv.FormatInt(now, 10),
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allowedSkew: 0,
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want: true,
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},
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{
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name: "allowedSkew 为 0 时不校验时间窗口",
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timestamp: strconv.FormatInt(now-86400, 10),
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allowedSkew: 0,
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want: true,
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},
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{
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name: "指定窗口内通过",
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timestamp: strconv.FormatInt(now-60, 10),
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allowedSkew: 5 * time.Minute,
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want: true,
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},
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{
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name: "超出窗口被拒",
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timestamp: strconv.FormatInt(now-600, 10),
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allowedSkew: 5 * time.Minute,
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want: false,
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},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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sig := SignWebhook(secret, tc.timestamp, eventID, rawBody)
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got := VerifyWebhook(secret, sig, tc.timestamp, eventID, rawBody, tc.allowedSkew)
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if got != tc.want {
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t.Fatalf("期望 %v,实际 %v", tc.want, got)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// 带不带 v1= 前缀都应被接受。
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func TestVerifyWebhookAcceptsSignatureWithoutPrefix(t *testing.T) {
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const (
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secret = "whsec_test"
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eventID = "evt_2"
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)
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rawBody := []byte(`{"a":1}`)
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timestamp := strconv.FormatInt(time.Now().Unix(), 10)
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full := SignWebhook(secret, timestamp, eventID, rawBody)
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if !VerifyWebhook(secret, full, timestamp, eventID, rawBody, 5*time.Minute) {
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t.Fatal("带 v1= 前缀的签名应通过")
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}
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if !VerifyWebhook(secret, full[len("v1="):], timestamp, eventID, rawBody, 5*time.Minute) {
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t.Fatal("不带 v1= 前缀的签名也应通过")
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}
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}
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// 任一必填字段为空都必须直接拒绝。
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func TestVerifyWebhookRejectsEmptyInputs(t *testing.T) {
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rawBody := []byte(`{}`)
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timestamp := strconv.FormatInt(time.Now().Unix(), 10)
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const (
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secret = "whsec_test"
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eventID = "evt_3"
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)
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sig := SignWebhook(secret, timestamp, eventID, rawBody)
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if VerifyWebhook("", sig, timestamp, eventID, rawBody, 5*time.Minute) {
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t.Fatal("空 secret 必须被拒")
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}
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if VerifyWebhook(secret, "", timestamp, eventID, rawBody, 5*time.Minute) {
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t.Fatal("空签名必须被拒")
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}
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if VerifyWebhook(secret, sig, "", eventID, rawBody, 5*time.Minute) {
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t.Fatal("空时间戳必须被拒")
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}
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if VerifyWebhook(secret, sig, timestamp, "", rawBody, 5*time.Minute) {
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t.Fatal("空 eventID 必须被拒")
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}
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}
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