feat(risk-control): 新增 IP/账号手动封禁,并收口财务同步的全表更新
- 风控:worker_risk_bans 表 + 前置封禁中间件(登录一并拦截)+ 后台列表/新增/解封 - 财务:成本快照补商品维度收口到本批 order_item_id,不再整表扫 899MB 的 order_items - 性能:order_items 覆盖索引(迁移 110)、大厅 pageSize 上限 20、已读/上传接口限流
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import type { NextFunction, Request, Response } from 'express'
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import { listActiveWorkerRiskBans } from '../repositories/worker-platform/worker-risk-ban-repo.js'
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import { buildErrorPayload, createHttpError } from '../utils/http.js'
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import { logError, logWarn } from '../utils/logger.js'
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import { extractFastWorkerId, resolveClientIp } from './worker-risk-control.js'
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/**
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* 手动封禁(IP / 账号)拦截中间件。
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*
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* 与 worker-risk-control 的分工:
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* · worker-risk-control:按**行为**自动升级(限流 → 惩罚 → 自动封号),状态在进程内存;
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* · 本中间件:按**人工决定**拦截,事实存在 worker_risk_bans 表,进程重启不丢。
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*
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* 性能约束(这是被刷场景下最热的代码):
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* · 每个请求只做两次 Set/Map 命中,绝不查库;
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* · 全量封禁列表进程内缓存 30 秒,后台增删封禁时立即失效(同进程);
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* · 加载失败 **fail-open**:宁可短暂漏挡,也不能因为一次数据库抖动把整个接单端挡死。
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*
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* 拦截范围:挂在整个 /api/v1/worker 路由之前,因此登录、大厅、订单、上传都会被挡;
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* 被封 IP 连登录都进不来——这正是运营想要的"现在就挡住它"。
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*/
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type WorkerBanSnapshot = {
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ips: Set<string>
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workers: Set<number>
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expiresAt: number
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}
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const CACHE_TTL_MS = 30_000
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/**
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* 归一化 IP:去掉 IPv6-mapped 前缀与方括号、统一小写。
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* 反向代理(Caddy)对 IPv4 请求可能给出 `::ffff:1.2.3.4`,不归一化会导致封了却挡不住。
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*/
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export function normalizeWorkerIp(value: unknown): string {
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return String(value || '')
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.trim()
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.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '')
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.replace(/^::ffff:/i, '')
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.toLowerCase()
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}
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let snapshot: WorkerBanSnapshot | null = null
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let inflightLoad: Promise<void> | null = null
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/** 后台增删封禁后调用,让本进程立即生效,不必等 TTL。 */
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export function invalidateWorkerBanCache(): void {
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snapshot = null
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}
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async function loadSnapshot(): Promise<void> {
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const rows = await listActiveWorkerRiskBans()
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const ips = new Set<string>()
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const workers = new Set<number>()
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for (const row of rows) {
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if (row.target_type === 'ip') {
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const ip = normalizeWorkerIp(row.target_value)
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if (ip) ips.add(ip)
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continue
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}
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const workerId = Number(row.worker_id || row.target_value)
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if (Number.isInteger(workerId) && workerId > 0) workers.add(workerId)
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}
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snapshot = { ips, workers, expiresAt: Date.now() + CACHE_TTL_MS }
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}
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async function ensureSnapshot(): Promise<WorkerBanSnapshot | null> {
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const now = Date.now()
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if (snapshot && snapshot.expiresAt > now) return snapshot
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if (!inflightLoad) {
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inflightLoad = loadSnapshot()
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.catch((error) => {
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// fail-open:记录一次,保留旧的快照(如果有),不要阻塞请求
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logError('[worker/ban-guard]', '加载手动封禁列表失败,本进程暂时放行', {
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error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
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})
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if (snapshot) snapshot.expiresAt = Date.now() + CACHE_TTL_MS
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})
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.finally(() => {
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inflightLoad = null
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})
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}
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await inflightLoad
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return snapshot
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}
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/** 同一目标 60 秒内只打一条日志,避免被封的脚本刷爆日志盘。 */
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const lastLogAt = new Map<string, number>()
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const LOG_INTERVAL_MS = 60_000
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function shouldLog(key: string): boolean {
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const now = Date.now()
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const last = lastLogAt.get(key) || 0
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if (now - last < LOG_INTERVAL_MS) return false
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lastLogAt.set(key, now)
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if (lastLogAt.size > 5_000) lastLogAt.clear()
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return true
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}
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export type WorkerBanLoader = () => Promise<
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Array<{ target_type: 'ip' | 'worker'; target_value: string; worker_id?: string | null }>
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>
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export function createWorkerBanGuardMiddleware(deps: { loadBans?: WorkerBanLoader } = {}) {
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// 测试注入用:不传则走真实仓储 + 30 秒缓存
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const injected = deps.loadBans
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return async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): Promise<void> => {
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const ip = normalizeWorkerIp(resolveClientIp(req))
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const workerId = extractFastWorkerId(req)
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let bannedIp = false
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let bannedWorker = false
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if (injected) {
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try {
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const rows = await injected()
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bannedIp = rows.some(
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(row) => row.target_type === 'ip' && normalizeWorkerIp(row.target_value) === ip,
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)
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bannedWorker =
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workerId !== null &&
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rows.some(
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(row) =>
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row.target_type === 'worker' &&
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Number(row.worker_id || row.target_value) === workerId,
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)
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} catch {
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bannedIp = false
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bannedWorker = false
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}
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} else {
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const current = await ensureSnapshot()
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bannedIp = Boolean(current?.ips.has(ip))
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bannedWorker = workerId !== null && Boolean(current?.workers.has(workerId))
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}
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if (!bannedIp && !bannedWorker) {
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next()
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return
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}
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const targetKey = bannedIp ? `ip:${ip}` : `worker:${workerId}`
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if (shouldLog(targetKey)) {
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logWarn('[worker/ban-guard]', '命中手动封禁,拒绝请求', {
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targetKey,
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ip,
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workerId,
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method: req.method,
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originalUrl: req.originalUrl,
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})
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}
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const error = createHttpError(
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bannedIp ? '该网络出口已被后台封禁,无法访问接单端' : '该接单账号已被后台手动封禁',
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{
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statusCode: 403,
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errorCode: bannedIp ? 'worker_ip_banned' : 'worker_account_banned',
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},
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)
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res.status(403).json(buildErrorPayload(error, '已被后台手动封禁'))
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}
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}
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/** 测试辅助:清空缓存与日志节流表。 */
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export function resetWorkerBanGuardForTest(): void {
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snapshot = null
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inflightLoad = null
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lastLogAt.clear()
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}
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