feat(risk-control): 新增 IP/账号手动封禁，并收口财务同步的全表更新

- 风控：worker_risk_bans 表 + 前置封禁中间件（登录一并拦截）+ 后台列表/新增/解封
- 财务：成本快照补商品维度收口到本批 order_item_id，不再整表扫 899MB 的 order_items
- 性能：order_items 覆盖索引（迁移 110）、大厅 pageSize 上限 20、已读/上传接口限流

apps/backend/src/services/worker-platform/admin-worker-risk-service.ts

@@ -1,11 +1,20 @@
 import type { JsonObject } from '../../types/json.js'
 import { createHttpError } from '../../utils/http.js'
 import { nowIso } from '../../utils/time.js'
+import { isIP } from 'node:net'
+import { invalidateWorkerBanCache, normalizeWorkerIp } from '../../middleware/worker-ban-guard.js'
 import {
   listActiveWorkerRiskTrackers,
   markWorkerRiskBanned,
   releaseWorkerRiskTracker,
 } from '../../middleware/worker-risk-control.js'
+import {
+  countWorkerRiskBans,
+  insertWorkerRiskBan,
+  listWorkerRiskBans,
+  revokeWorkerRiskBanById,
+  type WorkerRiskBanRow,
+} from '../../repositories/worker-platform/worker-risk-ban-repo.js'
 import {
   countWorkerRiskEvents,
   insertWorkerRiskEvent,
@@ -15,6 +24,7 @@ import {
 } from '../../repositories/worker-platform/worker-risk-repo.js'
 import {
   getWorkerUserById,
+  getWorkerUserByUsername,
   updateWorkerUser,
 } from '../../repositories/worker-platform/worker-repo.js'
 import { revokeAllWorkerSessions } from '../../repositories/worker-platform/worker-session-repo.js'
@@ -199,6 +209,253 @@ function normalizeWorkerId(value: number | string): number {
   return id
 }
 
+/**
+ * 手动封禁列表（IP / 账号）。
+ *
+ * 与「实时风控」的区别：这里读的是持久表 worker_risk_bans，进程重启不丢；
+ * 列表默认把生效中的排在最前（ORDER BY revoked_at NULLS FIRST）。
+ */
+export async function listAdminWorkerRiskBans(query: JsonObject = {}) {
+  const page = normalizePage(query.page)
+  const pageSize = normalizePageSize(query.pageSize)
+  const activeRaw = query.activeOnly ?? query.active_only
+  const activeOnly =
+    activeRaw === undefined || activeRaw === null || activeRaw === ''
+      ? undefined
+      : String(activeRaw) === 'true' || activeRaw === true
+
+  const filters = {
+    targetType: String(query.targetType ?? query.target_type ?? '').trim(),
+    keyword: String(query.keyword || '').trim(),
+    activeOnly,
+  }
+  const [rows, total] = await Promise.all([
+    listWorkerRiskBans({ ...filters, limit: pageSize, offset: (page - 1) * pageSize }),
+    countWorkerRiskBans(filters),
+  ])
+  return { items: rows.map(mapWorkerRiskBan), total, page, pageSize }
+}
+
+/** 最多封 30 天；0 / 不传 = 永久（运营处理外挂时一般选永久，再由人工解封）。 */
+const MAX_BAN_DURATION_MINUTES = 30 * 24 * 60
+
+/**
+ * 手动封禁一个 IP 或一个接单账号。
+ *
+ * · IP：写封禁表即可，中间件按请求 IP 拦截（登录也算，连门都进不来）；
+ * · 账号：写封禁表 + 冻结账号 + 踢掉全部登录设备 + 置位内存风控标记，
+ *   与「后台封号」等价，但多了一条可追溯的封禁记录。
+ */
+export async function banAdminWorkerRiskTarget(
+  actor: WorkerRiskActor = {},
+  payload: JsonObject = {},
+) {
+  const targetType = String(payload.targetType ?? payload.target_type ?? '')
+    .trim()
+    .toLowerCase()
+  if (targetType !== 'ip' && targetType !== 'worker') {
+    throw createHttpError('封禁类型只支持 IP 或账号', {
+      statusCode: 400,
+      errorCode: 'worker_risk_ban_type_invalid',
+    })
+  }
+  const rawTarget = String(
+    payload.target ?? payload.targetValue ?? payload.target_value ?? '',
+  ).trim()
+  if (!rawTarget) {
+    throw createHttpError('请填写要封禁的 IP 或账号', {
+      statusCode: 400,
+      errorCode: 'worker_risk_ban_target_invalid',
+    })
+  }
+
+  const reason =
+    String(payload.reason || '').trim() ||
+    (targetType === 'ip' ? '后台人工封禁 IP' : '后台人工封禁账号')
+  const durationMinutes = normalizeBanDuration(payload.durationMinutes ?? payload.duration_minutes)
+  const expiresAt =
+    durationMinutes > 0 ? new Date(Date.now() + durationMinutes * 60_000).toISOString() : null
+  const actorName = actor.displayName || actor.username || ''
+
+  if (targetType === 'ip') {
+    const ip = normalizeWorkerIp(rawTarget)
+    if (!isIP(ip)) {
+      throw createHttpError('IP 格式不正确（示例：203.0.113.9）', {
+        statusCode: 400,
+        errorCode: 'worker_risk_ban_target_invalid',
+      })
+    }
+    const row = await insertWorkerRiskBan({
+      targetType: 'ip',
+      targetValue: ip,
+      reason,
+      expiresAt,
+      createdBy: actor.userId ?? null,
+      createdByUsername: actorName,
+    })
+    if (!row) {
+      throw createHttpError('该 IP 已在封禁列表中', {
+        statusCode: 409,
+        errorCode: 'worker_risk_ban_exists',
+      })
+    }
+    invalidateWorkerBanCache()
+    await insertWorkerRiskEvent({
+      eventType: 'manual_banned',
+      targetKey: `ip:${ip}`,
+      ip,
+      reason,
+      action: 'manual',
+      actorUserId: actor.userId ?? null,
+      actorUsername: actorName,
+      detail: { banId: row.id, targetType: 'ip', expiresAt },
+    })
+    return { ban: mapWorkerRiskBan(row) }
+  }
+
+  const worker = await resolveWorkerForBan(rawTarget)
+  if (!worker) {
+    throw createHttpError('接单账号不存在', { statusCode: 404, errorCode: 'worker_not_found' })
+  }
+  const row = await insertWorkerRiskBan({
+    targetType: 'worker',
+    targetValue: String(worker.id),
+    workerId: Number(worker.id),
+    workerUsername: worker.username,
+    reason,
+    expiresAt,
+    createdBy: actor.userId ?? null,
+    createdByUsername: actorName,
+  })
+  if (!row) {
+    throw createHttpError('该账号已在封禁列表中', {
+      statusCode: 409,
+      errorCode: 'worker_risk_ban_exists',
+    })
+  }
+
+  const now = nowIso()
+  await updateWorkerUser(worker.id, {
+    status: 'frozen',
+    frozen_reason: reason,
+    frozen_at: now,
+    session_version: Number(worker.session_version || 1) + 1,
+    updated_at: now,
+  })
+  await revokeAllWorkerSessions(worker.id, now)
+  markWorkerRiskBanned(Number(worker.id))
+  invalidateWorkerBanCache()
+
+  await insertWorkerRiskEvent({
+    eventType: 'manual_banned',
+    targetKey: `worker:${worker.id}`,
+    workerId: Number(worker.id),
+    ip: String(payload.ip || '').trim(),
+    reason,
+    action: 'manual',
+    actorUserId: actor.userId ?? null,
+    actorUsername: actorName,
+    detail: { banId: row.id, targetType: 'worker', expiresAt },
+  })
+
+  return { ban: mapWorkerRiskBan(row), workerId: Number(worker.id), status: 'frozen' }
+}
+
+/**
+ * 解除一条手动封禁。
+ *
+ * 账号类型的封禁会连同解冻账号 + 释放内存风控标记——否则封禁记录没了、账号还是 frozen，
+ * 运营会以为没生效。IP 类型只改封禁表，不影响任何账号状态。
+ */
+export async function revokeAdminWorkerRiskBan(
+  banId: number | string,
+  actor: WorkerRiskActor = {},
+  payload: JsonObject = {},
+) {
+  const id = Number(banId)
+  if (!Number.isInteger(id) || id <= 0) {
+    throw createHttpError('封禁记录 ID 无效', {
+      statusCode: 400,
+      errorCode: 'worker_risk_ban_id_invalid',
+    })
+  }
+  const reason = String(payload.reason || '').trim() || '后台人工解封'
+  const actorName = actor.displayName || actor.username || ''
+  const row = await revokeWorkerRiskBanById(id, { revokedByUsername: actorName, reason })
+  if (!row) {
+    throw createHttpError('封禁记录不存在或已解除', {
+      statusCode: 404,
+      errorCode: 'worker_risk_ban_not_found',
+    })
+  }
+  invalidateWorkerBanCache()
+
+  const workerId = row.worker_id === null ? null : Number(row.worker_id)
+  if (row.target_type === 'worker' && workerId) {
+    const worker = await getWorkerUserById(workerId)
+    if (worker && worker.status === 'frozen') {
+      const now = nowIso()
+      await updateWorkerUser(workerId, {
+        status: 'active',
+        frozen_reason: '',
+        frozen_at: null,
+        session_version: Number(worker.session_version || 1) + 1,
+        updated_at: now,
+      })
+      await revokeAllWorkerSessions(workerId, now)
+    }
+    releaseWorkerRiskTracker({ workerId })
+  }
+
+  await insertWorkerRiskEvent({
+    eventType: 'manual_unbanned',
+    targetKey: row.target_type === 'ip' ? `ip:${row.target_value}` : `worker:${workerId}`,
+    workerId,
+    ip: row.target_type === 'ip' ? row.target_value : '',
+    reason,
+    action: 'manual',
+    actorUserId: actor.userId ?? null,
+    actorUsername: actorName,
+    detail: { banId: id, targetType: row.target_type },
+  })
+
+  return { ban: mapWorkerRiskBan(row) }
+}
+
+function normalizeBanDuration(value: unknown): number {
+  const parsed = Number(value)
+  if (!Number.isFinite(parsed) || parsed <= 0) return 0
+  return Math.min(MAX_BAN_DURATION_MINUTES, Math.trunc(parsed))
+}
+
+async function resolveWorkerForBan(target: string) {
+  const numeric = Number(target)
+  if (Number.isInteger(numeric) && numeric > 0) {
+    return getWorkerUserById(numeric)
+  }
+  return getWorkerUserByUsername(target)
+}
+
+function mapWorkerRiskBan(row: WorkerRiskBanRow) {
+  const expiresAt = row.expires_at ? new Date(row.expires_at) : null
+  const revokedAt = row.revoked_at ? new Date(row.revoked_at) : null
+  return {
+    id: String(row.id),
+    targetType: row.target_type,
+    target: row.target_value,
+    workerId: row.worker_id === null ? null : Number(row.worker_id),
+    workerUsername: row.worker_username,
+    reason: row.reason,
+    expiresAtIso: expiresAt ? expiresAt.toISOString() : null,
+    active: !revokedAt && (!expiresAt || expiresAt.getTime() > Date.now()),
+    createdByUsername: row.created_by_username,
+    createdAtIso: new Date(row.created_at).toISOString(),
+    revokedAtIso: revokedAt ? revokedAt.toISOString() : null,
+    revokedByUsername: row.revoked_by_username,
+    revokeReason: row.revoke_reason,
+  }
+}
+
 function mapWorkerRiskEvent(row: WorkerRiskEventRow) {
   return {
     id: String(row.id),

apps/backend/src/services/worker-platform/worker-hall-service.ts

@@ -26,6 +26,15 @@ import { WorkerListCache } from './worker-list-cache.js'
 const HALL_LIST_CACHE_TTL_MS = 2_000
 const hallListCache = new WorkerListCache(HALL_LIST_CACHE_TTL_MS)
 
+/**
+ * 大厅列表单页硬上限。
+ *
+ * 每张卡片都要拼单汇总 + 权限判定，pageSize=100 在生产实测单次接近 2 秒（DB 执行时间），
+ * 而 2026-10-30 那个脚本固定请求 pageSize=100 轮询，是唯一能低成本放大的入口。
+ * 前端本来就按 page 翻页，收到更小的 pageSize 也只是多翻几页。
+ */
+const HALL_MAX_PAGE_SIZE = 20
+
 // 排行榜每次都要对全量 work_orders + work_order_shares 做去重聚合（生产实测
 // 742ms / 35,483 块 ≈ 277MB），而结果只在工单验收完成时才变化。
 // 大厅每次刷新/窗口聚焦都会触发前端重新拉取，不缓存时该查询独占全库约 8% 的缓冲读。
@@ -38,7 +47,7 @@ const hallLeaderboardCache = new WorkerListCache(HALL_LEADERBOARD_CACHE_TTL_MS)
 export async function listWorkerHallOrders(query: JsonObject = {}, session: WorkerSession) {
   requireActiveWorkerSession(session)
   const page = normalizePage(query.page)
-  const pageSize = normalizePageSize(query.pageSize)
+  const pageSize = Math.min(HALL_MAX_PAGE_SIZE, normalizePageSize(query.pageSize))
   const categoryId = normalizeOptionalId(query.categoryId)
   const worker = await getRequiredWorker(session.workerId)
   const permissions = resolveWorkerPermissions(worker)

apps/backend/src/services/worker-platform/worker-platform-service.test.ts

@@ -2990,6 +2990,37 @@ test('后台「店铺」筛选下拉必须缓存 + 写路径失效（单次全
   )
 })
 
+test('接单端入口必须有手动封禁守卫，大厅单页上限 20，高频写接口有独立限流', async () => {
+  const { readFile } = await import('node:fs/promises')
+
+  // 2026-10-30：脚本固定 pageSize=100 轮询大厅，单次查询近 2 秒（每张卡都要拼单汇总）
+  const hallSrc = await readFile(new URL('./worker-hall-service.ts', import.meta.url), 'utf8')
+  assert.ok(hallSrc.includes('HALL_MAX_PAGE_SIZE = 20'), '大厅缺少单页上限常量')
+  assert.ok(
+    hallSrc.includes('Math.min(HALL_MAX_PAGE_SIZE, normalizePageSize(query.pageSize))'),
+    '大厅 pageSize 必须被服务端夹到 20，不能信任客户端',
+  )
+
+  // 手动封禁守卫挂在整个 /worker 路由之前（登录也算），否则封了 IP 还能重新登录
+  const routerSrc = await readFile(new URL('../../routes/worker.ts', import.meta.url), 'utf8')
+  const guardAt = routerSrc.indexOf('createWorkerBanGuardMiddleware()')
+  const authAt = routerSrc.indexOf('router.use(workerAuthPublicRoutes)')
+  assert.ok(guardAt > 0, '缺少手动封禁守卫')
+  assert.ok(guardAt < authAt, '封禁守卫必须在鉴权路由之前挂载：被封 IP 连登录都不能放')
+
+  // 两个最贵的写接口各自限流（读接口 337 次/10 分钟、上传 95 次/10 分钟都是生产实测）
+  const ordersSrc = await readFile(
+    new URL('../../routes/worker/orders.ts', import.meta.url),
+    'utf8',
+  )
+  assert.ok(ordersSrc.includes("scope: 'worker:order-read'"), '标记已读缺少限流')
+  const profileSrc = await readFile(
+    new URL('../../routes/worker/profile.ts', import.meta.url),
+    'utf8',
+  )
+  assert.ok(profileSrc.includes("scope: 'worker:files-upload'"), '附件上传缺少限流')
+})
+
 test('残留字段 work_orders.task_id 不得再被当成关联键 JOIN（迁移 091）', async () => {
   const { readFile } = await import('node:fs/promises')