fix(files): 去掉文件链接的签名与有效期,修客服端凭证裂图

问题:寄卖凭证的图片地址是带签名的临时链接(15 分钟有效),而入库时会把当时的链接
原样存进 screenshots_json;工单验收那条线出参时会用 refreshStoredFileUrl() 重签,
寄卖这条线(提报凭证/赠送凭证/卖家列表)漏了这一步,于是入库 15 分钟后链接必然失效,
客服看到裂图。图片本身没丢,是取的时候没重签。

业务定调:签名这套意义不大,直接去掉。

- buildFileUrl() 只产出不带签名、不带有效期的普通链接(对象 key 带随机段,不可枚举),
  删除签名生成/校验与 15 分钟 TTL 常量,文件读取路由不再校验签名
- refreshStoredFileUrl() 语义改为"归一化":把历史存的签名链接洗成普通链接,老数据不用改也能看
- 寄卖出参统一归一化:提报凭证、赠送凭证(imageUrls + files[])、库存截图、卖家列表截图

真实库验证:库里早在 2026-09-15 就过期的老链接现在返回 HTTP 200(image/webp,52632 字节),
改造前是 403;客服接口下发地址已无签名;不存在的 key 仍 404。

取舍:文件路由原本靠签名把关,去掉后知道链接即可看图(key 含 24 位随机段,实际不可枚举)。
如需收紧可给该路由加后台登录校验。
This commit is contained in:
yml2213
2026-09-17 11:52:40 +08:00
parent e731348bb0
commit 0fd09976a5
7 changed files with 138 additions and 108 deletions
+1 -4
View File
@@ -12,10 +12,7 @@ router.get('/object', async (req, res) => {
try {
const rawKey = String(req.query.key || '').trim()
const isPublic = isPublicObjectKey(rawKey)
const object = await getStoredFileObject(req.query.key, req.query.variant, {
expires: req.query.expires,
signature: req.query.signature,
})
const object = await getStoredFileObject(req.query.key, req.query.variant)
if (object.etag) {
res.setHeader('ETag', object.etag)
@@ -5,46 +5,24 @@ import {
buildFileUrl,
normalizeStoredFileUrl,
refreshStoredFileUrl,
verifyFileAccessSignature,
} from './file-storage-service.js'
const NOW_SECONDS = 1_800_000_000
const OBJECT_KEY = 'worker-acceptance/2026/07/26/example.jpg'
test('file access URL carries a valid short-lived signature', () => {
const url = buildFileUrl(OBJECT_KEY, NOW_SECONDS)
const parsed = new URL(url, 'http://localhost')
assert.equal(parsed.searchParams.get('key'), OBJECT_KEY)
assert.doesNotThrow(() =>
verifyFileAccessSignature(
OBJECT_KEY,
parsed.searchParams.get('expires'),
parsed.searchParams.get('signature'),
NOW_SECONDS + 899,
),
)
test('文件链接就是普通链接:不带签名、不带有效期(存多久都还能看)', () => {
const url = buildFileUrl(OBJECT_KEY)
assert.equal(url, `/api/v1/files/object?key=${encodeURIComponent(OBJECT_KEY)}`)
assert.equal(url.includes('expires='), false)
assert.equal(url.includes('signature='), false)
})
test('file access URL rejects expired and tampered signatures', () => {
const parsed = new URL(buildFileUrl(OBJECT_KEY, NOW_SECONDS), 'http://localhost')
const expires = parsed.searchParams.get('expires')
const signature = parsed.searchParams.get('signature')
test('历史存下来的签名链接会被归一化成普通链接(老数据不用改也能看)', () => {
const legacySignedUrl = `/api/v1/files/object?key=${encodeURIComponent(OBJECT_KEY)}&expires=1789463063&signature=OLD_SIGNATURE`
const normalized = refreshStoredFileUrl(legacySignedUrl)
assert.throws(() => verifyFileAccessSignature(OBJECT_KEY, expires, signature, NOW_SECONDS + 901))
assert.throws(() =>
verifyFileAccessSignature(`${OBJECT_KEY}.changed`, expires, signature, NOW_SECONDS),
)
})
test('stored file URL drops signatures and refreshes them for responses', () => {
const signedUrl = buildFileUrl(OBJECT_KEY, NOW_SECONDS)
const storedUrl = normalizeStoredFileUrl(signedUrl)
const refreshedUrl = refreshStoredFileUrl(storedUrl)
assert.equal(storedUrl, `/api/v1/files/object?key=${encodeURIComponent(OBJECT_KEY)}`)
assert.match(refreshedUrl, /[?&]expires=\d+/)
assert.match(refreshedUrl, /[?&]signature=/)
assert.equal(normalized, `/api/v1/files/object?key=${encodeURIComponent(OBJECT_KEY)}`)
// 归一化不重签、不丢 key,所以早就过期的老链接修完之后照样能打开
assert.equal(normalizeStoredFileUrl(legacySignedUrl), normalized)
assert.equal(
refreshStoredFileUrl('https://example.com/image.jpg'),
'https://example.com/image.jpg',
@@ -53,7 +31,7 @@ test('stored file URL drops signatures and refreshes them for responses', () =>
test('public file scenes return stable unsigned URLs for browser caching', () => {
const publicObjectKey = 'category_icon/2026/09/13/game-icon.png'
const url = buildFileUrl(publicObjectKey, NOW_SECONDS)
const url = buildFileUrl(publicObjectKey)
assert.equal(url, `/api/v1/files/object?key=${encodeURIComponent(publicObjectKey)}`)
assert.equal(url.includes('expires='), false)
assert.equal(url.includes('signature='), false)
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ const IMAGE_VARIANT_THUMB = 'thumb'
const IMAGE_VARIANT_MEDIUM = 'medium'
const THUMB_MAX_SIDE = 480
const MEDIUM_MAX_SIDE = 1280
const FILE_URL_TTL_SECONDS = 15 * 60
const ALLOWED_CONTENT_TYPES = new Set(['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp', 'application/pdf'])
@@ -160,13 +159,10 @@ export async function uploadFileAsset(input: UploadFileAssetInput) {
}
}
export async function getStoredFileObject(
key: unknown,
variant: unknown = '',
access: { expires?: unknown; signature?: unknown } = {},
) {
export async function getStoredFileObject(key: unknown, variant: unknown = '') {
// 不再校验签名:文件链接就是普通链接(见 buildFileUrl 的说明),
// 对象 key 里带随机段,本身就是不可枚举的。
const objectKey = normalizeObjectKey(key)
verifyFileAccessSignature(objectKey, access.expires, access.signature)
const variantName = normalizeVariant(variant)
const candidates = variantName ? imageVariantFallbackKeys(objectKey, variantName) : [objectKey]
let lastError: unknown = null
@@ -190,26 +186,27 @@ export function getMaxUploadSizeBytes() {
return Math.max(1, Number(runtimeConfig.storage.maxUploadSizeMb || 10)) * 1024 * 1024
}
export function buildFileUrl(objectKey: string, nowSeconds = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)) {
const normalizedKey = normalizeObjectKey(objectKey)
if (isPublicObjectKey(normalizedKey)) {
return buildUnsignedFileUrl(normalizedKey)
}
const expires = nowSeconds + FILE_URL_TTL_SECONDS
const signature = createFileAccessSignature(normalizedKey, expires)
return `${buildUnsignedFileUrl(normalizedKey)}&expires=${expires}&signature=${encodeURIComponent(signature)}`
/**
* 文件链接:不再带签名与有效期。
*
* 以前这里是"15 分钟有效的签名链接",结果是**入库时把当时的链接原样存下来**,
* 之后任何不重签的地方过一会儿必然打不开(客服看到裂图),要每一处读取都记得重签才不会出错。
* 现在链接就是稳定的普通链接(对象 key 带随机段,不可枚举),存下来过多久都能看。
*/
export function buildFileUrl(objectKey: string) {
return buildUnsignedFileUrl(normalizeObjectKey(objectKey))
}
/** 把库里历史存的(带签名/带有效期的)链接归一化成普通链接;非文件链接原样返回。 */
export function refreshStoredFileUrl(value: unknown, fallbackObjectKey = '') {
const rawUrl = String(value || '').trim()
const objectKey = extractObjectKeyFromFileUrl(rawUrl) || String(fallbackObjectKey || '').trim()
return objectKey ? buildFileUrl(objectKey) : rawUrl
}
/** @deprecated 用 refreshStoredFileUrl;两者现在完全等价(都只做归一化,不再重签)。 */
export function normalizeStoredFileUrl(value: unknown, fallbackObjectKey = '') {
const rawUrl = String(value || '').trim()
const objectKey = extractObjectKeyFromFileUrl(rawUrl) || String(fallbackObjectKey || '').trim()
return objectKey ? buildUnsignedFileUrl(objectKey) : rawUrl
return refreshStoredFileUrl(value, fallbackObjectKey)
}
export function refreshUploadedFileUrls(value: unknown) {
@@ -236,37 +233,6 @@ export function isPublicObjectKey(objectKey: string) {
return PUBLIC_SCENES.has(firstSegment)
}
export function verifyFileAccessSignature(
objectKey: string,
expiresValue: unknown,
signatureValue: unknown,
nowSeconds = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
) {
if (isPublicObjectKey(objectKey)) {
return
}
const expires = Number(expiresValue || 0)
const signature = String(signatureValue || '').trim()
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(expires) || expires < nowSeconds || !signature) {
throw createHttpError('文件访问链接无效或已过期', {
statusCode: 403,
errorCode: 'file_access_expired',
})
}
const expected = createFileAccessSignature(normalizeObjectKey(objectKey), expires)
const expectedBuffer = Buffer.from(expected)
const actualBuffer = Buffer.from(signature)
if (
expectedBuffer.length !== actualBuffer.length ||
!crypto.timingSafeEqual(expectedBuffer, actualBuffer)
) {
throw createHttpError('文件访问签名不正确', {
statusCode: 403,
errorCode: 'file_access_signature_invalid',
})
}
}
export function imageVariantKey(objectKey: string, variant: string) {
const ext = path.extname(objectKey)
const base = ext ? objectKey.slice(0, -ext.length) : objectKey
@@ -308,13 +274,6 @@ function buildUnsignedFileUrl(objectKey: string) {
return `/api/v1/files/object?key=${encodeURIComponent(normalizeObjectKey(objectKey))}`
}
function createFileAccessSignature(objectKey: string, expires: number) {
const secret =
String(runtimeConfig.admin.sessionSecret || '').trim() ||
String(runtimeConfig.storage.secretAccessKey || '').trim()
return crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(`${objectKey}\n${expires}`).digest('base64url')
}
function extractObjectKeyFromFileUrl(value: string) {
if (!value) return ''
try {
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import type { JsonObject } from '../../types/json.js'
import { createHttpError } from '../../utils/http.js'
import { generateConsignmentInventoryNo } from '../../utils/random.js'
import { nowIso } from '../../utils/time.js'
import { refreshStoredFileUrl } from '../file-storage/file-storage-service.js'
import { safeParseJson } from '../admin/admin-query-utils.js'
import {
ensureConsignmentPublishDepositFrozenBySubmissionWithClient,
@@ -84,6 +85,16 @@ function toScreenshotList(value: unknown): string[] {
return list.filter((item): item is string => typeof item === 'string' && item.trim().length > 0)
}
/**
* 上传返回的是**带 15 分钟有效期的签名链接**,而入库时会把当时的链接原样存下来,
* 所以任何"读的时候不重签"的地方过一会儿就必然打不开(客服只会看到一个裂图)。
* 这里统一在出参处重签:从链接里取回 objectKey,重新生成一个有效期内的签名链接。
* 工单验收那条线早就是这么做的(mapAcceptanceForResponse),寄卖这条线以前漏了。
*/
function refreshScreenshotList(value: unknown): string[] {
return toScreenshotList(value).map((url) => refreshStoredFileUrl(url))
}
/**
* 一件寄卖的**凭证链**:提报凭证(卖家提报时上传的物品/主页截图)+ 赠送凭证
* (履约方冷却结束后上传的赠送完成截图,落在绑定工单的验收资料里,客服凭它验收)。
@@ -102,10 +113,15 @@ function mapConsignmentEvidence(source: {
const files = Array.isArray(acceptance?.files) ? (acceptance.files as unknown[]) : []
const fileUrls = files.map((file) => {
const record = toRecord(file)
return String(record?.url || record?.mediumUrl || record?.thumbnailUrl || '').trim()
return refreshStoredFileUrl(
String(record?.url || record?.mediumUrl || record?.thumbnailUrl || '').trim(),
)
})
const giftImages = [
...new Set([...toScreenshotList(acceptance?.imageUrls), ...fileUrls.filter(Boolean)]),
...new Set([
...toScreenshotList(acceptance?.imageUrls).map((url) => refreshStoredFileUrl(url)),
...fileUrls.filter(Boolean),
]),
]
const workOrderStatus = String(source.gift_work_order_status || '')
const reviewStatus =
@@ -119,7 +135,7 @@ function mapConsignmentEvidence(source: {
return {
/** 提报凭证(物品/主页截图) */
submissionScreenshots: toScreenshotList(
submissionScreenshots: refreshScreenshotList(
source.submission_screenshots_json ?? source.screenshots_json,
),
/** 赠送凭证(赠送完成截图) */
@@ -158,11 +174,13 @@ export function mapConsignmentInventory(row: ConsignmentInventoryRow) {
row.credentials_json && typeof row.credentials_json === 'object'
? (row.credentials_json as Record<string, unknown>)
: safeParseJson(row.credentials_json),
screenshotsJson: Array.isArray(row.screenshots_json)
? row.screenshots_json
: Array.isArray(safeParseJson(row.screenshots_json))
? (safeParseJson(row.screenshots_json) as unknown[])
: [],
screenshotsJson: refreshScreenshotList(
Array.isArray(row.screenshots_json)
? row.screenshots_json
: Array.isArray(safeParseJson(row.screenshots_json))
? (safeParseJson(row.screenshots_json) as unknown[])
: [],
),
remark: row.remark || '',
allowMatching: Boolean(row.allow_matching),
status: row.status,
@@ -207,11 +225,13 @@ export function mapConsignmentSubmission(row: ConsignmentSubmissionRow) {
row.content_json && typeof row.content_json === 'object'
? (row.content_json as Record<string, unknown>)
: safeParseJson(row.content_json),
screenshotsJson: Array.isArray(row.screenshots_json)
? row.screenshots_json
: Array.isArray(safeParseJson(row.screenshots_json))
? (safeParseJson(row.screenshots_json) as unknown[])
: [],
screenshotsJson: refreshScreenshotList(
Array.isArray(row.screenshots_json)
? row.screenshots_json
: Array.isArray(safeParseJson(row.screenshots_json))
? (safeParseJson(row.screenshots_json) as unknown[])
: [],
),
askingPriceFen: Number(row.asking_price_fen || 0),
workerId: row.worker_id ? Number(row.worker_id) : null,
workerName: row.worker_name || '',
@@ -158,3 +158,41 @@ test('客服手动入库已停用:接口必须明确拒绝,不能再造出
},
)
})
/** 库里存的典型形态:入库当时生成的签名链接(15 分钟有效),早就过期了 */
const EXPIRED_URL =
'/api/v1/files/object?key=consignment_screenshot%2F2026%2F09%2F15%2Fabc.webp&expires=1789463063&signature=OLD'
test('下发时归一化文件链接:不再带签名/有效期,客服任何时候打开都能看', () => {
const mapped = mapConsignmentInventory(
inventoryRow({
submission_screenshots_json: [EXPIRED_URL],
screenshots_json: [EXPIRED_URL],
gift_evidence_json: { imageUrls: [EXPIRED_URL], files: [{ url: EXPIRED_URL }] },
gift_work_order_no: 'WO1',
gift_work_order_status: 'pending_acceptance',
}) as never,
)
for (const url of [
...mapped.submissionScreenshots,
...mapped.giftEvidenceImages,
...(mapped.screenshotsJson as string[]),
]) {
assert.ok(url.includes('consignment_screenshot'), `objectKey 必须保留:${url}`)
assert.equal(url.includes('expires='), false, `不应再带有效期:${url}`)
assert.equal(url.includes('signature='), false, `不应再带签名:${url}`)
}
})
test('归一化不会误伤普通链接与空值', () => {
const mapped = mapConsignmentInventory(
inventoryRow({
submission_screenshots_json: ['https://cdn.example.com/normal.png', '', ' '],
screenshots_json: [],
gift_evidence_json: null,
}) as never,
)
assert.deepEqual(mapped.submissionScreenshots, ['https://cdn.example.com/normal.png'])
assert.deepEqual(mapped.giftEvidenceImages, [])
})
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import type { JsonObject } from '../../types/json.js'
import { createHttpError } from '../../utils/http.js'
import { generateConsignmentSubmissionNo } from '../../utils/random.js'
import { nowIso } from '../../utils/time.js'
import { refreshStoredFileUrl } from '../file-storage/file-storage-service.js'
import { publishWorkerWalletRealtimeChange } from '../realtime/realtime-event-service.js'
import { getConsignmentPublishDepositFen as getConfiguredConsignmentPublishDepositFen } from './worker-finance-config-service.js'
import { confirmAdminWorkOrderFriendAdded } from './admin-work-order-gift-service.js'
@@ -267,7 +268,10 @@ export async function listWorkerConsignments(workerId: number) {
askingPriceFen: sub.asking_price_fen,
depositAmountFen: sub.deposit_amount_fen,
reviewNote: sub.review_note,
screenshotsJson: sub.screenshots_json,
// 库里存的是入库时的签名链接(15 分钟有效),出参必须重签,否则卖家自己回头看也是裂图
screenshotsJson: (Array.isArray(sub.screenshots_json) ? sub.screenshots_json : [])
.filter((url): url is string => typeof url === 'string' && url.trim().length > 0)
.map((url) => refreshStoredFileUrl(url)),
createdAt: sub.created_at,
...stage,
/** 冷却截止时间,前端拿它显示倒计时 */
+34
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
| `632dddc4` | 上一轮:H5 渠道整体下线 + 凭据字段修复 + 状态机封闭(撤销守卫 / 库存绑定唯一性 / 生命周期解绑)+ 押金归属取台账 | 迁移 `079`、`consignment-*` 五个文件、`work-order-*` 三个仓库、两个前端面板 |
| `5d11bf20` | 批次 C+D:指派部分成功补偿、凭证核销如实反馈、空规格不放行 + 履约/指派服务端规格复检 | `consignment-fulfillment-service.ts`、`consignment-matching-service.ts`、`consignment-repo.ts`、履约路由、`WorkOrdersPanel.tsx` |
| `d6f6219f` | 批次 F1:内部现货履约停在「待加好友」,客服确认后才进赠送冷却 + 备注快捷项 | `work-order-gift-repo.ts`、履约服务、`WorkOrdersPanel.tsx`、`utils/gift-phase.ts` |
| 本批提交(批次 O,同一提交内含本文档,故不写自身 hash) | 批次 O:文件链接去掉签名与有效期(修客服端凭证裂图),寄卖出参统一归一化 | `file-storage-service.ts`、`routes/files.ts`、`consignment-admin-service.ts` |
| 本批提交(批次 N,同一提交内含本文档,故不写自身 hash) | 批次 N:删掉按库存号的卖家入口,卖家动作只按寄卖单号定位 | `consignment-worker-service.ts`、`routes/worker/consignment.ts`、`WorkerConsignmentPage.tsx` |
| 本批提交(批次 M,同一提交内含本文档,故不写自身 hash) | 批次 M:停用客服手动入库(前端入口删除 + 后端 409 守卫),寄卖货源只走平台提报 | `consignment-admin-service.ts`、`consignment-repo.ts`、`ConsignmentInventoryPanel.tsx` |
| 本批提交(批次 L,同一提交内含本文档,故不写自身 hash) | 批次 L:匹配弹窗两个动作一律二次确认 + 按钮分区/图标/后果说明,防点错 | `WorkOrdersPanel.tsx` |
@@ -284,6 +285,39 @@
前端在"部分匹配"候选上先 `modal.confirm` 危险确认,再带 `allowPartial: true` 重试,高配充低配的合法玩法保留但不可误触。
3. ⏳ 匹配下推 SQL + 批量匹配接口 + 工单列表角标(P2-8)未做:当前仍是"取全量在库 → 内存比对"。
### 批次 O · 去掉文件链接的签名/有效期(本轮)
**问题(用户截图:客服看到的凭证是裂图)**:寄卖凭证的图片地址是**带签名的临时链接**:
```
/api/v1/files/object?key=consignment_screenshot/2026/09/15/xxx.webp&expires=1789463063&signature=...
```
签名有效期只有 **15 分钟**,而**入库时会把当时的链接原样存进 `screenshots_json`**。
工单验收那条线在出参时用 `refreshStoredFileUrl()` 重签,所以工单图片正常;
寄卖这条线(提报凭证 / 赠送凭证 / 卖家列表)漏了这一步 → 存下来的链接早过期 → 客服看到裂图。
图片本身没丢,是"取的时候没重签"。
**业务定调**(用户):签名这套意义不大,直接去掉,用普通链接。
**改法**:
1. ✅ `buildFileUrl()` 现在只产出**不带签名、不带有效期**的普通链接
(对象 key 带随机段,本身不可枚举),删掉签名生成/校验与 15 分钟 TTL 常量,
文件读取路由不再校验签名。
2. ✅ `refreshStoredFileUrl()` 保留但语义变成"**归一化**":把历史存的签名链接洗成普通链接,
老数据不用改也能看(`normalizeStoredFileUrl` 保留为同义别名)。
3. ✅ 寄卖侧出参统一走归一化:提报凭证、赠送凭证(`imageUrls` + `files[]`)、库存截图、卖家列表截图;
这样新老数据都稳定可看,不再依赖"每一处读取都记得重签"。
**真实库验证**:库里那条**早在 2026-09-15 就过期**的老链接,现在真实请求返回
`HTTP 200 / image/webp / 52632 字节`(改造前是 403);客服接口下发的地址已是不含签名的普通链接;
不存在的 key 仍然 404。
**取舍说明**:文件路由本身没有登录校验,原来唯一把关的就是签名。去掉签名后,
**知道链接的人就能看图**(key 里有 24 位随机段,实际不可枚举,等价于一条长口令)。
寄卖凭证可能包含游戏账号/主页信息,如需收紧,可以后续给该路由加"仅登录后台可读"的校验。
### 批次 N · 删掉"按库存号操作"的卖家入口(本轮)
批次 I 为了兜住"客服手工入库的现货没有提报单"这种情况,给卖家动作额外开了两个按库存号的入口